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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC LAW
BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
CONSEQUENCES OF FILING PETITION
The trustee in bankruptcy, upon his qualification, automatically gets
title to the non-exempt property of a bankrupt, with effect from the date the
petition in bankruptcy was filed.' In Howard v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp.,2 after installment purchasers of an automobile became bank-
rupt and the bankruptcy court approved sale of the automobile by the trustee
in bankruptcy to the finance company in full satisfaction of its claim against
the bankrupt estate, the finance company owned the car; consequently,
peaceful taking of the car by the defendant finance company from in front of
plaintiffs' house was not a tortious act, and the trial court's award of
summary judgment to defendant was affirmed.
Under Rule 401 (a) of the Bankruptcy Rules which became effective on
October 1, 1973, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy "shall operate as a
stay of the commencement or continuation of any action against the
bankrupt, or the enforcement of any judgment against him, if the action or
judgment is founded on an unsecured provable3 debt other than one not
dischargeable under clause (1), (5), (6), or (7) of § 17a4 of the Act." 5 Other
paragraphs of Rule 401 provide for relief from the stay at the instance of a
creditor. Witherwax v. Zurich Insurance Co.6 involved a third-party
demand against one who had become bankrupt and had obtained from the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See§ 70a, Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § l10a (1970).
2. 324 So.2d 834 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
3. See § 63, Bankruptcy Act, I 1 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1970).
5. See also Rule 601(a): "Stay Against Lien Enforcement.-The filing of a
petition shall operate as a stay of any act or the commencement or continuation of any
court proceeding to enforce (1) a lien against property in the custody of the
bankruptcy court, or (2) a lien against the property of the bankrupt obtained within 4
months before bankruptcy by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable
process or proceedings." With reference to clause (2), see § 67a, Bankruptcy Act, I I
U.S.C. § 107a (1970).
6. 315 So.2d 420 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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bankruptcy court a specific stay order which the bankrupt then filed in the
pending litigation. The trial court properly stayed the third-party action, and
its order was affirmed on appeal.
CONFLICT WITH BANKRUPTCY ACT
Matter of Loftin7 was an action for reinstatement, with back pay and
benefits, by one whose employment was terminated because he had filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy in violation of a regulation of the
Shreveport Fire Department. After his dismissal had been upheld by the
Shreveport Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, plaintiff ap-
pealed to the district court which ordered his reinstatement with payment of
all back wages and benefits. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the
challenged regulation conflicted with the objectives of Congress in the
Bankruptcy Act and thus was invalid under the Supremacy Clause. In
reaching this result the court relied generally on Perez v. Campbell,' which
struck down a section of Arizona's Vehicle Safety Responsibility Statute
providing that an unsatisfied judgment against a motorist was ground for
suspension of the motorist's license and registration even though the
judgment had been discharged in bankruptcy, and followed Rutledge v. City
of Shreveport,9 which had invalidated a rule of the Shreveport Police
Department almost identical with the Fire Department rule.
DEBTS UNAFFECTED BY DISCHARGE
Section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides in part:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts . . . except such as . . .(2) are liabilities for...
willful and malicious conversion of the property of another. .... 0
In Electronic Credit Corp. v. Fairbanks," an action on promissory
notes, plaintiff had financed a retail tire business, taking as security chattel
mortgages on merchandise under an agreement that as merchandise was
sold payments should be made to plaintiff from the proceeds of sale. In fact,
plaintiff neither insisted on such payments nor required that the proceeds be
kept in a separate account. Shortly before filing his petition in bankruptcy on
April 21, 1969, defendant upon advice of his attorney used cash derived
from merchandise sales to pay debts of the business for wages and taxes.
7. 327 So.2d 543 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
8. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
9. 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1970) amending II U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1960).
11. 320 So.2d 281 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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Subsequently he received his discharge in bankruptcy and raised it as a
defense against plaintiff, which asserted that defendant's application of the
proceeds of its security to other debts was a "willful and malicious injury to
the . . . property of another" 12 with the result that plaintiff's claim was
unaffected by the discharge. The court of appeal in a well-reasoned opinion
concluded that there was no "willful and malicious conversion" on the facts
of this case. 13
PROMISE TO PAY DISCHARGED DEBT
A new promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is actionable
without new consideration,14 and giving a new note for a discharged debt
amounts to such a promise. 15 Discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish
the debt but gives an affirmative defense 16 against its assertion. 17 In
Louisiana the discharged debt subsists as a natural obligation' 8 which is "a
sufficient consideration for a new contract."' 9 Maxwell Motors, Inc. v.
Tolar20 held that by signing a new note the discharged bankrupt elected to
revive the natural obligation.
CHAPTER X SALE WITHOUT APPRAISAL
Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Spalitta2' was an action
against accommodation guarantors for the balance due on the note of a
debtor in reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, after
12. These words of the statute, as it stood when defendant filed his petition and
gained his discharge in 1969, were authoritatively construed to include "willful and
malicious conversion." Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
13. 320 So.2d at 287. Had defendant become bankrupt after December 18, 1970,
the effective date of the 1970 Bankruptcy Act amendments, the question of the effect
of defendant's discharge on plaintiff's claim would have been one for the bankruptcy
court. See § 17c, Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 35c (1970).
14. IA W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.33 (1971).
15. Booty v. American Finance Corp., 224 So. 2d 512 (La App. 2d Cir. 1969).
16. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1005.
17. O'Neill v. D.H. Holmes Co., 232 So.2d 849 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). Where,
however, a debt was reduced to judgment then discharged in bankruptcy, and the
debtor subsequently acknowledged or reaffirmed the debt in what was assumed to
amount to a new promise to pay, the creditor could not thereafter enforce his
discharged judgment by garnishment but had first to obtain a judgment on the new
promise. Homemakers Loan & Consumer Discount Co. v. Arthur, 333 So. 2d 686
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1757(2).
19. Id. art. 1759(2).
20. 330 So.2d 334 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
21. 321 So. 2d 338 (La. 1975).
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application of the proceeds of mortgaged properties of the debtor, sold
without appraisal under order of the bankruptcy court. Defendants filed an
exception of no cause of action for want of the appraisal required by the
Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act.22 The trial court sustained the excep-
tion, and the court of appeal affirmed.23 The supreme court granted
certiorari24 and reversed, three justices dissenting. Had the principal debtor
been in straight bankruptcy, its property could not have been sold without
appraisal.25 The provision requiring appraisal in straight bankruptcy, how-
ever, specifically is made inapplicable2 6 to Chapter X; and § 116 states that
the judge may "authorize a receiver or a trustee or a debtor in possession,
upon such notice as the judge may prescribe and upon cause shown, to lease
or sell any property of the debtor, whether real or personal, upon such terms
and conditions as the judge may approve .... "" The majority concluded
that application of the Deficiency Judgment Act to sales under Chapter X
would frustrate the intent of Congress, impair the uniformity sought by
Congress, and interfere with the bankruptcy court's "exclusive jurisdiction
of the debtor and its property, wherever located," 2 8 and on rehearing this
decision was confirmed. The dissent emphasized the strong public policy
underlying the Deficiency Judgment Act. Given the paucity---even the
absence--of authority, 29 the problem certainly is not free from doubt but the
reasoning of the majority supports the result.
22. LA. R.S. 13:4106, 4107 (1950).
23. 295 So.2d 18 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
24. 299 So.2d 360 (La. 1974).
25. § 70f, Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § Il0f (1970).
26. § 102, Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 516 (3) (1970).
28. § 111, Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970).
29. Bowl-Opp, Inc. v. Larson, 334 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. La. 1971), a diversity case
which held that the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act applied to Chapter X sales,
was necessarily only a prediction of what the Louisiana courts would decide-a
mistaken prediction as it turned out. The supreme court rejected Bowl-Opp, Inc. v.
Larson and discussed with approval J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Vessel Morning
Star, 431 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1970), rehearing en banc, 457 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1972),
which held the Deficiency Judgment Act inapplicable in the context of the National
Maritime Act.
